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1 Introduction
This paper presents a theoretical analysis of bargaining on managerial delegation between owner-
shareholders and managers in a differentiated-products market. Modern corporate governance
codes includes clauses retiring the disclosure of managerial compensation in order to protect
owner-shareholders against the opportunistic behavior of managers. This paper aims to ex-
plain the effects of managerial power and the disclosure of managerial compensation on market
outcomes in the case wherein each firm produces a differentiated good.
A theoretical analysis of the separation of ownership and management challenges the va-
lidity of the traditional assumption of a firm as the sole profit maximizing agent. With the
development of a principal-agent model, studies have been conducted to clarify the interaction
between owner-manager contracts and market behavior in the context of an oligopolistic indus-
try with managerial delegation. In their well-known articles, Fershtman and Judd (1987) and
Sklivas (1987) revealed that profit-maximizing owners sometimes choose to divert the preference
of their managers away from profit maximization. They investigated a two-stage duopolistic
game where in the first stage, each profit-maximizing owner chooses a compensation scheme for
his or her manager that is a linear combination of profit and sales. Based on the two semi-
nal works, the literature on delegation games extended its scope to alternative compensation
schemes. Salas Fumas (1992) and Miller and Pazgal (2002) considered the compensation scheme
as a linear combination of the profit of a firm and its rival. Jansen et al. (2007) investigated the
case in which each manager’s remuneration is a weighted sum of the firm’s profit and market
share.
Another major branch of the literature on managerial delegation considers bargaining is-
sues between an owner and a manager in various environments. Since the pioneering work by
Fershtman (1985), this type of model has particularly focused on wage bargaining. Szyman-
ski (1994) and Bughin (1995) analyzed the influence of the delegation of wage bargaining with
unions to managers on product market competition, depending on the type of the managerial
compensation scheme. Along the lines of these works, Witteloostuijn et al. (2007) considered
the bargaining between owners and managers over their compensation contracts, in order to
explain the disclosure obligation that is central to many modern corporate governance codes.
More precisely, they analyzed the two-stage duopolistic game where in the first stage owners
negotiate with their managers over managerial delegation contracts. Subsequently, in the second
stage, Cournot competition with a homogeneous good is observed.
The main purpose of this paper is to expand the scope of the results of Witteloostuijn et al.
(2007) with respect to the sales delegation case to those of a differentiated-products duopolistic
game. In this paper, the game operates in the same manner as that in Witteloostuijn et al.
(2007). However, we investigate both Cournot and Bertrand competitions. In short, we extend
the scope of the strategic managerial delegation model with bargaining between owners and
managers by considering both product differentiation and the change in firms’ strategic variables.
Through these analyses, we intend to determine whether or not the results of Witteloostuijn et al.
(2007) of the sales delegation is robust against a change(s) in the degree of product differentiation
and/or the firms’ strategic variables. We obtain the result that competition is promoted in
both Cournot and Bertrand fashions irrespective of the degree of product differentiation, as
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the relative bargaining power of the manager increases. Thus, in the context of a symmetric
duopolistic competition with bargaining between owners and managers, we find that the results
of Cournot competition with homogeneous goods are robust against the changes in the degree
of product differentiation and firms’ (managers’) strategic variables.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the basic
setting of the delegation game of the two types of models considered in this paper. In Section
3, we consider the case of quantity competition. In Section 4, we investigate the case of price
competition. Section 5 presents the concluding remarks.
2 Model
We consider a symmetric duopolistic model using a standard product differentiation model as
in Singh and Vives (1984). A representative consumer’s utility is denoted as
U(q1, q2) = a (q1 + q2)− 12
[
(q1)
2 + 2bq1q2 + (q2)
2
]
+ q,
where qi represents the quantity of good i (= 1, 2), and b ∈ (0, 1) represents the degree of
product differentiation. Note that q denotes a numeraire good. The utility function generates
the system of linear demand functions:
qi =
a (1− b)− pi + bpj
1− b2 , b ∈ (0, 1) , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Then, the inverse demand functions can be inverted to obtain
pi = a− qi − bqj , b ∈ (0, 1) , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j,
where pi represents the price of good i (= 1, 2). We assume that both the firms have constant
marginal costs of production, c (< a). The profit of firm i is given by
Πi = (a− qi − bqj − c)qi
=
a (1− b)− pi + bpj
1− b2 (pi − c) , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Usually, social welfare, denoted by W , is measured as the sum of consumer surplus (CS) and
producer surplus (PS):
W = CS + PS,
where PS = Π1 +Π2, and CS is given by
CS =
1
2
[
(q1)
2 + 2bq1q2 + (q2)
2
]
,
=
2a2 (1− b) + (p1)2 − 2bp1p2 + (p2)2 − 2a (1− b) (p1 + p2)
2 (1− b2) .
We consider the situation in which a firm’s owner decides to delegate the control of his or
her assets to a manager, similar to the case in Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987).
Both the firms’ owners can assess the performance of their managers according to two readily
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observable indicators–the output and profit of the firm. In this case, the objective of each
manager is given by
Ui = Πi + θiqi, θi ∈ R, i = 1, 2,
where parameter θi measures the relevance of sales. The manager of firm i can maximize his or
her payoff by choosing the output qi or the price pi that maximizes Ui (i = 1, 2). This can be
supported by the assumption that the payoff to the manager of firm i is represented as λi+µiVi
for some real number λi and some positive number µi (i = 1, 2). Similar to many existing works,
we assume that the payoffs to the managers are negligible as compared to profits, because we
emphasize the impact of managerial delegation on the equilibrium outcomes.
We propose the following two-stage delegation game. In the first stage, an owner and his or
her manager bargain over the incentive parameter θi in each firm (i = 1, 2). Subsequently, in
the second stage, each manager simultaneously decides his or her output or price while being
aware of the level of his or her own incentive parameter. Thus, owners and managers bargain
over their incentive parameters in the sales delegation contracts such that both their profits and
payoffs are enhanced through their collusive market behaviors.
The bargaining in the first stage is generally formulated in the same manner as in Binmore
et al. (1986). For each firm, the equilibrium outcome of the bargaining process coincides with
the Nash bargaining solution of the following equation in terms of the incentive parameter θi:
Bi = U
β
i ·Π1−βi , i = 1, 2,
where β ∈ [0, 1) denotes the measure for the relative bargaining power of the manager. Note
that in this paper, we restrict our attention to the symmetric case in which all managers have the
same bargaining powers β. As a result, we assume that owners select sufficiently homogeneous
managers both in terms of their bargaining powers and the preferences to their payoffs. The
disagreement point of both owner and manager is zero: If the bargaining process breaks down,
the managers are unable to procure the other jobs, and the owners are unable to operate run
their firms since they do not have adequate time or managerial skills.
3 Quantity Competition
In this section, we consider how profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare depend on the
relative bargaining power of the manager, β, for the sales delegation in the case of quantity
competition in a differentiated-products duopolistic setting.
As usual, we begin by solving the second stage. Given a pair of incentive parameters θ1 and
θ2, each manager maximizes his or her objective Ui with respect to qi (i = 1, 2). The condition
for each manager is given by
∂Ui
∂qi
= a− c− 2qi − bqj + θi = 0, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Solving the system of the above equations for q0 and q1, we obtain the output of each firm as
follows:
qi =
a (2− b)− c (2− b) + 2θi − bθj
4− b2 , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
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According to the first-order condition of the above system, we have
Ui = (qi)
2 , Πi = (qi)
2 − θiqi, i = 1, 2.
Thus, we obtain the following results:
∂Ui
∂θi
=
4qi
4− b2 > 0,
∂2Πi
∂θ2i
= −4
(
2− b2)
(4− b2)2 < 0, ∀b ∈ (0, 1) , i = 1, 2.
In short, similar to the results of the sales delegation case of Witteloostuijn et al. (2007), we
obtain the result that the objective function of the manager Ui is an increasing function of θi,
and the profit of each firm is an concave function of θi (i = 1, 2). The interests of the owner
and manager of each firm are different. Therefore, it is appropriate for them to bargain over the
incentive parameter, θi (i = 1, 2).
We now proceed to the analysis of the first stage of the game. Considering the outcomes in
the first stage, we rewrite the Nash product for the bargaining problem of each firm as follows:
Bi = U
β
i ·Π1−βi = (qi)2β ·
[
(qi)
2 − θiqi
]1−β
, i = 1, 2.
Thus, analogous to Witteloostuijn et al. (2007), we obtain the following first-order condition for
the bargaining of each firm:
∂Bi
∂θi
= 0⇔ [2qi − θi (1 + β)] ∂qi
∂θi
− qi (1− β) = 0, i = 1, 2.
Taking into account that ∂qi/∂θi = 2/
(
4− b2) and that the problem’s symmetry θ = θ1 = θ2,
we obtain
∂Bi
∂θi
= 0⇔ a
[
b2 (1− β) + 4β]− b2 (1− β) (c− θ)− 2bθ (1 + β)− 4 (cβ + θ)
(2− b) (2 + b)2 = 0,
yielding
θ∗ = θ∗i =
b2 (1− β) + 4β
4 + 2b (1 + β)− b2 (1− β) (a− c) , i = 1, 2.
The equilibrium outcomes (denoted by superscript “∗”) are obtained as follows:
q∗i =
2 (1 + β)
4 + 2b (1 + β)− b2 (1− β) (a− c) ; p
∗
i =
a
(
2− b2) (1− β) + 2c (1 + b) (1 + β)
4 + 2b (1 + β)− b2 (1− β) ;
Π∗i =
2
(
2− b2) (1− β) (1 + β)
[4 + 2b (1 + β)− b2 (1− β)]2 (a− c)
2 ; i = 1, 2;
CS∗ =
4 (1 + b) (1 + β)2
[4 + 2b (1 + β)− b2 (1− β)]2 (a− c)
2 ;
W ∗ =
4 (1 + β)
[
3− β + b (1 + β)− b2 (1− β)]
[4 + 2b (1 + β)− b2 (1− β)]2 (a− c)
2 .
Furthermore, we obtain the following result:
∂Π∗i
∂β
= −4
(
2− b2) [4β + 2b (1 + β) + b2 (1− β)]
[4 + 2b (1 + β)− b2 (1− β)]3 (a− c)
2 < 0,
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∀b ∈ (0, 1) , ∀β ∈ [0, 1) , i = 1, 2.
In short, the partial derivative of the equilibrium profit of each firm with β is negative for all
the values of b ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ [0, 1). On the other hand, we have
∂CS∗
∂β
=
16 (1 + b)
(
2− b2) (1 + β)
[4 + 2b (1 + β)− b2 (1− β)]3 (a− c)
2 > 0, ∀b ∈ (0, 1) , ∀β ∈ [0, 1) ,
and
∂W ∗
∂β
=
8
(
2− b2)2 (1− β)
[4 + 2b (1 + β)− b2 (1− β)]3 (a− c)
2 > 0, ∀b ∈ (0, 1) , ∀β ∈ [0, 1) .
With respect to the equilibrium consumer surplus and social welfare, the partial derivatives with
β are positive for all the values of b ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ [0, 1). The preceding results are summarized
in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. If each owner in a symmetric Cournot duopoly hires a manager who receives a
payoff through the managerial incentive contract based on profits and sales, and if the incentive
parameter on sales is the outcome of a bargaining process, then the corresponding delegation
game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which depends on the bargaining power β
of the managers. Moreover, if the bargaining power of the managers increases, the equilibrium
profit of each firm decreases, whereas the consumer surplus and social welfare increases.
Note that similar to Witteloostuijn et al. (2007), as the measure for the relative bargaining
power of the manager β approaches 1, the equilibrium profit of each firm, Π∗i approaches 0,
whereas the consumer surplus, CS∗ and social welfare, W ∗ gradually increase.
4 Price Competition
In this section, we analyze the price competition case in which each firm produces a differentiated
good. We again use backward induction and consider a two-stage process in which the owners
and managers bargain over the incentive parameter in the first stage, and both the firms compete
with regard to prices in the second stage.
Given a pair of incentive parameters θ1 and θ2, each manager maximizes the objective func-
tion Ui with respect to pi (i = 1, 2). The first-order condition for each manager is given by
∂Ui
∂pi
=
a (1− b) + c− 2pi + bpj − θi
1− b2 = 0, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Solving the system of the above equations for p0 and p1, we obtain the price of each firm as
follows:
pi =
a
(
2− b− b2)+ c (2 + b)− 2θi − bθj
4− b2 , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Considering the first-order condition of each manager, we obtain
Ui =
[a (1− b)− pi + bpj ]2
1− b2 ,
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Πi =
[a (1− b)− pi + bpj ] [a (1− b)− pi + bpj − θi]
1− b2 , i = 1, 2.
Thus, we obtain the following results:
∂Ui
∂θi
=
2
(
2− b2)
(4− b2) qi > 0,
∂2Πi
∂θ2i
= − 4
(
2− b2)
(4− b2)2 (1− b2) < 0, ∀b ∈ (0, 1) , i = 1, 2.
Therefore, similar to quantity competition, we find that in price competition the objective
function of each manager Ui is an increasing function of θi, and the profit of each firm is a
concave function of θi (i = 1, 2).
Next, we analyze the bargaining between owners and managers in the first stage. In the case
of price competition, the bargaining problem is as follows:
Bi = U
β
i ·Π1−βi
=
{
[a (1− b)− pi + bpj ]2
1− b2
}β
·
{
[a (1− b)− pi + bpj ] [a (1− b)− pi + bpj − θi]
1− b2
}1−β
,
i = 1, 2.
Considering the problem’s symmetry, θ = θ1 = θ2, we obtain
∂Bi
∂θi
= 0
⇔ a (1− b) [4β − b2 (1 + β)]− b3c (1 + β) + b2 (1 + β) (c+ θ)
− 4 (cβ + θ) + 2b [2cβ + θ (1− β)] = 0, i = 1, 2,
yielding
θ∗ = θ∗i =
(1− b) [4β − b2 (1 + β)]
4− 2b (1− β)− b2 (1 + β) (a− c) , i = 1, 2.
We obtain the equilibrium outcomes as follows:
p∗i =
2a (1− b− β + bβ) + c (2− b2) (1 + β)
4− 2b (1− β)− b2 (1 + β) , q
∗
i =
(
2− b2) (1 + β)
(1 + b) [4− 2b (1− β)− b2 (1 + β)] (a− c) ;
Π∗i =
2
(
2− 2b− b2 + b3) (1− β2)
(1 + b) [4− 2b (1− β)− b2 (1 + β)]2 (a− c)
2 ; i = 1, 2;
CS∗ =
(
2− b2)2 (1 + β)2
(1 + b) [4− 2b (1− β)− b2 (1 + β)]2 (a− c)
2 ;
W ∗ =
(
2− b2) (1 + β) [2 (3− β)− 4b (1− β)− b2 (1 + β)]
(1 + b) [4− 2b (1− β)− b2 (1 + β)]2 (a− c)
2 .
Furthermore, we obtain the following result:
∂Π∗i
∂β
= −4
(
2− 2b− b2 + b3) [2b (1− β) + 4β − b2 (1 + β)]
(1 + b) [4− 2b (1− β)− b2 (1 + β)]3 (a− c)
2 < 0,
∀b ∈ (0, 1) , ∀β ∈ [0, 1) .
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Thus, we find that the equilibrium profit of each firm decreases for all the values of b ∈ (0, 1)
and β ∈ [0, 1) as the relative bargaining power of the manager, β, increases. On the other hand,
we obtain
∂CS∗
∂β
=
8 (1− b) (2− b2)2 (1 + β)
(1 + b) [4− 2b (1− β)− b2 (1 + β)]3 (a− c)
2 > 0, ∀b ∈ (0, 1) , ∀β ∈ [0, 1) ,
and
∂W ∗
∂β
=
16 (1− b)2 (2− b2) (1− β)
(1 + b) [4− 2b (1− β)− b2 (1 + β)]3 (a− c)
2 > 0, ∀b ∈ (0, 1) , ∀β ∈ [0, 1) .
Thus, we find that both the equilibrium consumer surplus and social welfare improves as the
relative bargaining power of the managers, β, increases in contrast to the equilibrium profit of
each firm. The preceding results are summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. If each owner in a symmetric Bertrand duopoly hires a manager who receives a
payoff through the managerial delegation contract based on profits and sales, and if the incentive
parameter on sales is the outcome of a bargaining process, then the corresponding delegation
game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which depends on the bargaining power β
of the managers. Moreover, if the bargaining power of the managers increases, the equilibrium
profit of each firm decreases, whereas the consumer surplus and social welfare increase.
Note that analogous to quantity competition, as β approaches 1, the equilibrium profit of
each firm, Π∗i approaches 0, whereas the consumer surplus, CS
∗ and social welfare,W ∗ gradually
increase.
5 Conclusion
This paper examined the bargaining between owners and managers over managerial incentive
contracts for the sales delegation case in two types of differentiated-products markets with
Cournot and Bertrand competitions. We analyzed whether or not the results of Witteloostuijn
et al. (2007) are robust against the changes in the degree of product differentiation and/or
firms’ (managers’) strategic variables. We obtained the result that the managerial power of the
managers, β, is positively associated with the equilibrium consumer surplus and social welfare,
similar ot that in Witteloostuijn et al. (2007). Therefore, the result of the managerial delegation
game with bargaining between owners and managers is robust against such extensions.
Similar to most existing works, we assume the simultaneous-movement of both the firms
in the market stage. The interesting extension of our model is to examine whether or not
the results of this paper are robust in the case of the sequential-movement of both the firms.
Futuere research should focus on other compensation schemes, e.g., the relative profit delegation
and market share delegation cases, and should confirm the robustness of the results in this paper.
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